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Distance Rationalizability of Scoring Rules
Burak Can
Abstract Collective decision making problems can be seen as finding an outcome
that is “closest” to a concept of “consensus”. [1] introduced “Closeness to Unanim-
ity Procedure” as a first example to this approach and showed that the Borda rule
is the closest to unanimity under swap distance (a.k.a the [2] distance). [3] shows
that the Dodgson rule is the closest to Condorcet under swap distance. [4, 5] gen-
eralized this concept as distance-rationalizability, where being close is measured
via various distance functions and with many concepts of consensus, e.g., unanim-
ity, Condorcet etc. In this paper, we show that all non-degenerate scoring rules can
be distance-rationalized as “Closeness to Unanimity” procedures under a class of
weighted distance functions introduced in [6]. Therefore, the results herein gener-
alizes [1] and builds a connection between scoring rules and a generalization of the
Kemeny distance, i.e. weighted distances.
JEL classification: C63, D71, D72, D74 Keywords: Strict preferences; Rankings;
Distance-rationalizability
1 Introduction
[1] introduced the closeness to unanimity procedures (CUPs) for collective decision
making problems. Given a distance function - for the concept of closeness - over
preference profiles, these procedures finds “closest” unanimous preference profiles
to the original preference profile at hand. This approach, in a sense, yields the out-
come which requires the minimal total compromise towards a unanimous agreement
from a utilitarian perspective.
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[3] uses other consensus concepts such as the existence of Condorcet winner in
a profile. Then the compromise needed is not to achieve a unanimous profile but to
achieve a Condorcet winner as least costly as possible. They show that if the consen-
sus concept is not unanimity but only a Condorcet winner, then the Dodgson winner
in a profile is the closest to the Condorcet winner under a compromise defined as
the Kemeny (swap) distance.
[4, 5] generalize the notion of closeness to various concepts of consensus as
distance-rationalization. They use many reasonable consensus classes apart from
unanimity, and employ different distance functions to shed light on the existing
collective choice rules and their relation to distance functions within a consensus
approach.
We focus on one particular class of rules, i.e., non-degenerate1 scoring rules. [1]
showed that the simplest scoring rule, i.e. the Borda rule, is equivalent to closeness
to unanimity procedure under Kemeny distance. This means Borda rule is somewhat
rationalized by Kemeny distance. [4] and [7] extend this result and show that non-
degenerate scoring rules are rationalized by a class which we shall call scoring-
distances. They also show that if for a scoring rule, the scores of positions are equal
for some positions, i.e., it is a degenerate scoring rule, then it can be rationalized by
a pseudo-distance.
In this paper, we show that the non-degenerate scoring rules can also be ratio-
nalized by another class of distance functions introduced in [6], i.e., weighted dis-
tances. There it is shown that weighted distances are generalizations of the Kemeny
distance. Hence, the connection between “Borda” and the “Kemeny” distance re-
vealed in [1], can be extended to the connection between “scoring rules” and the
“weighted distances”. The main difference of our results, with those in [4, 7], is that
the weighted distances satisfy a condition called decomposability which is a weak-
ening of one of the Kemeny distance axioms, i.e., betweenness. Hence the rational-
izability of Borda with Kemeny distance is naturally extended to rationalizability of
scoring rules with weighted Kemeny distances.
2 Model
2.1 Preliminaries
Let N be a finite set of agents with cardinality n, and A be the set of finite set
of alternatives with cardinality m. The set of all possible strict preferences, i.e.,
complete, transitive and antisymmetric binary relations over A, is denoted byL . A
generic preference is denoted by R∈L whereas the set of strict preferences with an
alternative a at the top is denoted by L a. A preference profile is an n-tuple vector
1 Non-degenerate scoring rules are rules that never assign same score to different positions in a
ranking, therefore these rules do not include plurality, k-approval rule etc.
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of preferences denoted by p = (p(1), p(2), . . . , p(n)) ∈ L N . Given an alternative
a ∈ A, we denote profiles with a as the top alternative in each individual preference
by pa.
For l = 1,2, . . . ,m, R(l) denotes the alternative in the lth position in R, e.g., R(1)
denotes the top alternative. Given an alternative a and a preference R, we denote
the position of a in R by a(R), i.e., a(R) = x if and only if a = R(x). To denote the
position of alternative a in the preference of ith individual in a profile, we abuse
notation and write a(i) instead of a(p(i)), as long as it is clear which preference
profile we refer to. Two linear orders (R,R′) ∈L 2 form an elementary change2 in
position k whenever R(k) = R′(k+ 1), R′(k) = R(k+ 1) and for all t 6∈ {k,k+ 1},
R(t) =R′(t), i.e. |R\R′|= 1. Given any two distinct linear orders R,R′ ∈L , a vector
of linear orders ρ = (R0,R1, . . . ,Rk) is called a path between R and R′ if k = |R\R′|,
R0 = R, Rk = R′ and for all i= 1,2, . . .k, (Ri−1,Ri) forms an elementary change. For
the special case where R = R′, we denote the unique path as ρ = (R,R).
A vector s = (s1,s2, . . . ,sm) over positions of alternatives in a preferences is
called a scoring vector whenever s1 ≥ s2 ≥ . . .sm ≥ 0. A scoring vector s is called
non-degenerate if scores are strictly decreasing from s1 to sm, i.e., s1 > s2 > .. .sm ≥
0 . The score of an alternative a in a preference R is denoted by score(a,R) and is
equal to sa(R) in the scoring vector.
A collective choice rule, or a voting rule, is a correspondence α :L N → 2A \ /0,
which assigns each preference profile a nonempty subset of alternatives. Given
a preference profile p ∈ L N , a scoring rule, denoted by αs, with scoring vec-
tor s is a choice rule that assigns a summed score to each alternative in A as:
∑i∈N score(a, p(i)) and assigns to each profile the alternatives with maximal total
scores:
αs(p) = max
a∈A ∑i∈N
score(a, p(i))
Example 1. Let s = (m− 1,m− 2, . . . ,0), then the Borda rule on each preference
profile is defined as:
αBorda(p) = argmax
a∈A ∑i∈N
score(a, p(i)) = argmax
a∈A ∑i∈N
(m−a(i)))
Let us now dwell upon the concepts of “closeness” between individual prefer-
ences and thereafter preference profiles. Let a function δ : L ×L → R assign a
real number to each pair of preferences. A function over preferences is a distance
function if it satisfies:
(i) Non-negativity: δ (R,R′)≥ 0 for all R,R′ ∈L ,
(ii) Identity of indiscernibles: δ (R,R′) = 0 if and only if R = R′ for all R,R′ ∈L ,
(iii) Symmetry: δ (R,R′) = δ (R,R′) for all R,R′ ∈L .
(iv) Triangular inequality: δ (R,R′′)≤ δ (R,R′)+δ (R′,R′′) for all R,R′,R′′ ∈L .
2 We omit the parenthesis whenever it is clear and write R,R′ instead.
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Two well-known examples of distance function are the discrete distance, and
the swap distance, a.k.a., the Kemeny distance. The former assigns 0 if the two
preferences are identical, and 1 otherwise. The latter, characterized by [2] and [8],
counts the symmetric total number of disjoint ordered pairs in preferences, or simply
the minimal number of “swaps of adjacent alternatives” required to transform one
preference into another.3[4] also refer to functions that satisfy i, iii, and iv. These
functions, which lack the identity of indiscernibles condition, are called pseudo-
distance functions. These functions may assign 0 to distances between distinct pair
of rankings, e.g., δ (abc,cab) = 0.
For distance rationalizability we will mainly refer to distance functions between
preference profiles. Given a distance function δ over preferences, a straightforward
extension of δ over preference profiles, say p, p′ ∈L N , can be defined as a function
d :L N×L N → R as follows:
d(p, p′) = ∑
i∈N
δ (p(i), p′(i)).
Note that it is a very straightforward and common extension of distances over
individual preferences to distances over preference profiles, e.g., see [9]. We abuse
notation for the sake of simplicity by referring to δ instead of d as long as it is clear.
2.2 Distance rationalizability
We consider only the “unanimity” as a consensus class. The definitions below are
adapted smoothly to our notation for simplicity. For a more general notation that
would be applicable to many other consensus classes, we refer the reader to [4, 5].
Definition 1. (U,δ )-score: The unanimity-score of an alternative a in a preference
profile p under the distance function δ ; is the minimal distance between the profile
p and any profile pa where a is unanimity winner. Formally:
(U,δ )−score(a, p) = min
pa∈L N
δ (p, pa).
Roughly speaking, (U,δ )−score of an alternative in a profile tells us how costly
it is -in terms of a distance function- to make this alternative the best alternative
in each individual preference, i.e., the unanimity winner. Obviously there are many
possible preference profiles, pa, where the alternative a is the unanimity winner. The
aforementioned score assigns the total cost to convert the original profile to one of
such profiles for which the total cost is minimal. Next we reproduce the definition
of distance rationalizability. We adapt again from [5] to simplify our notation.
3 In the literature, the swap distance and the Kemeny distance is interchangeably used. [2] orig-
inally assumes the distance for elementary changes to be 2, whereas in many works, for conve-
nience, this is normalized to 1. This occurs especially when the domain of preferences is strict and
there is no indifference.
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Definition 2. A collective choice rule α , is distance-rationalizable via unanimity
and a distance function δ , or simply (U,δ )-rationalizable, if for all profiles p∈L N ,
we have:
α(p) = argmin
a∈A
(U,δ )−score(a, p)
To state verbally, a rule is (U,δ )-rationalizable if each outcome the rule assigns to
each profile is also an alternative which have the minimal (U,δ )-score for that pro-
file, i.e., the least costly to make the unanimity winner with that distance function.
2.3 Weighted distances
[6] introduced weighted distances as an extension of the Kemeny distance on strict
rankings, which would allow for differential treatment of the position of elemen-
tary changes. For instance consider, R = abc, R′ = acb, and R¯ = bac. The Kemeny
distance between R and R′ is 1 as well as the Kemeny distance between R and R¯.
However one might argue that the former two is less dissimilar than the latter two,
i.e., δω(R,R′)< δω(R, R¯), because a swap at the top of rankings may be more crit-
ical than a swap at the bottom of thereof.
A weighted distance assigns weights to positions of such swaps with a weight
vector on all possible swaps, e.g., ω = (ω1,ω2, . . . ,ωm−1). For any two rankings,
then, that require more than a single swap, one would find the summation of sequen-
tial swaps on a shortest4 path between the two rankings. Hence a path between the
two rankings is decomposed into elementary changes, and each elementary change
is assigned its corresponding weight according to the weight vector.
For a technical description of the weighted distances, we refer the reader to
[6]. Note that in the case of distance rationalizability, the complication regarding
multiple paths between rankings do not occur. Hence, it is sufficient to illustrate a
weighted distance with an example below:
Example 2. Let R= abcd, and R′ = dabc. Consider the weight vector ω = (10,3,1)
and a weighted distance δω , i.e., a swap of alternatives at top creates a distance of
10, at the middle a distance of 3, and at the bottom a distance of 1. Then:
δ (R,R′) = δ (abcd,abdc)+δ (abdc,adbc)+δ (adbc,dabc)
δ (R,R′) = ω3+ω2+ω1 = 10+3+1 = 14.
4 An example of the two possible shortest paths between R = abc and R′ = cba would then be
ρ1 = [abc,bac,bca,cba] and ρ2 = [abc,acb,cab,cba].
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3 Results
Nitzan (1981) proved that the plurality rule is (U,δdiscrete)-rationalizable and that
Borda’s rule is (U,δKemeny)-rationalizable. In this paper we extend the Borda result
to all non-degenerate5 scoring rules. In the sequel, we shall not use the term “non-
degenerate” anymore to avoid repetition as long as it is clear. We show that any
scoring rule is (U,δω)-rationalizable where δω is a weighted distance with particular
weights. Note that the class of weighted distance functions are characterized by
two conditions on top of the usual metric conditions, i.e., positional neutrality and
decomposability (see [6]). Both conditions are in fact weakening of characterizing
axioms of the Kemeny distance, which allow for differential treatment of positions
in a ranking. Therefore to allow for scoring rules other than Borda, such weakening
of the distance functions is necessary.
The results, herein, extend the existing interconnectedness (of the Borda rule and
the Kemeny distance) to those between “all scoring rules” and “weighted distances”.
Weighted distances are Kemeny-like metrics which assign weights on the position
of the swaps required to convert one (strict) ranking to another. In that respect, the
Kemeny distance is also a weighted distance where weights on all possible swaps
-regardless of their positions- are identical.
We first state the result then discuss its implications and its relation to the dis-
tance functions that also rationalize scoring rules as in [7]. Let αs be a scoring choice
rule with the scoring vector s = (s1,s2, . . . ,sm). Then consider a weighted distance
δω with the weight vector ω = ∆s= (s1−s2,s2−s3, . . . ,sm−1−sm), i.e., the weight
assigned to each swap is the difference between the scores of the relevant consec-
utive positions. In the following theorem we explain the connection with the class
of weighted distance functions and the distance rationalizability of non-degenerate
scoring rules.
Theorem 1. A scoring rule αs is (U,δ )-rationalizable if δ = δω with ω = ∆s, i.e.,
δ is a weighted distance with ω = ∆s.
Proof. Let δ = δω be a weighted distance function with a weight vector ω = ∆s =
(si− si+1)m−1i=1 . We want to show that αs is (U,δω)-rationalizable which means for
all profiles p ∈L n, and for all alternatives a ∈ A, we have a ∈ αs(p) if and only
if (U,δω)-score of a is minimal for all a ∈ A. Take any p ∈ L n and any a ∈ A.
Now for each i ∈ N, let p¯a(i) ∈L a be such that p¯a(i) is identical to p(i) except that
alternative a is taken to top while everything else remains the same. By triangular
inequality of δω , note that p¯a(i)= argminpa∈L a δω(p(i), pa), i.e., p¯a(i) is the closest
to p(i) among all other preferences which have a at the top. This is simply because
when construction p¯a(i), we leave everything unchanged except bringing a to the
top. Hence, for the constructed preference profile p¯a ∈L N , the alternative a is the
5 By non-degenerate scoring rule we mean a non-degenerate scoring vector wherein si > si+1 for
all i = 1,2, . . . ,m.
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unanimity winner and furthermore p¯a is the closest to the original profile p among
all other profiles pa ∈L N where a is the unanimity winner.
Then, (U,δω)− score(a, p) is ∑ni=1 δ (p(i), p¯a(i)). By definition of a weighted
distance and construction of ω , this equals to ∑ni=1∑
a(i)−1
t=1 ωt = ∑
n
i=1∑
a(i)−1
t=1 (st −
st+1), which6 in turn equals to ∑ni=1(s1− sa(i)) = n× s1−∑ni=1 sa(i). Note that the
score of a in αs is ∑ni=1 sa(i). Obviously, n× s1−∑ni=1 sa(i) is minimal if and only
if ∑ni=1 sa(i) is maximal. Hence (U,δω)− score(a, p) is minimal if and only if a ∈
αs(p). This completes the proof as the choice of p and a is arbitrary.
Let us finally dwell upon the significance of these results. The scoring distances
introduced in [7] are not decomposable hence they are not weighted distances. This
implies that a comparison between two ranking cannot be additively decomposed
into elementary changes as in Example 2. This is slightly not fitting to the spirit of
the Kemeny distance. However the main advantage of the framework applied in [7]
is the functions therein can also be used to pseudo-distance rationalize many popular
degenerate rules, e.g., Plurality, Borda, Veto, and k-approval. Weighted distances, by
construction however, cannot rationalize such rules.
In Example 2, one can see “positional neutrality” leading to assigning the same
value so long as the swaps are at the same position. “Decomposability” is also seen
in the example via the additivity of distances on pairs that require a single swap.
Note that these are weakening of the original [2] axioms. This particular weakening
of those conditions lead to the class of weighted distances. As we already know
“Kemeny” and “Borda” are very interconnected, it is interesting to see that a natural
“generalization” of the former, i.e., the weighted distances, helps us rationalize the
“generalization” of the latter, i.e., the scoring rules.
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